Note – This article was published in The Valley of Death by Tatul Hakobyan. The article was first published in 2020.
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1918-20. Nakhijevan and Kars in exchange for Artsakh and Zangezour
The British were the first to propose settling territorial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan through the exchange of land.
They tried to convince Armenia to give up on Artsakh and Zangezour in 1919. Instead, the British promised to join Nakhiյevan and Kars with Armenia.
Azerbaijan had claims on Artsakh, Zangezour, and Nakhiյevan, as well as Kars in 1918-1920.
While the British empire was present in South Caucasus at this time, their suggested solution for Armenians and Azerbaijanis was to make a population swap of the disputed territories. The British offer was to move all Armenians of Artsakh to Ararat valley, while the Tatars (Azerbaijanis) living in the valley would move to Karabakh.
After the defeat of the Ottoman Turks and their departure from the Transcaucasus, the British forces, which had moved into the regions the latter had vacated, were trying to subject Karabakh and Zangezur to Azerbaijan. In the beginning the same policy was being carried out for Kars. The British did not want to irritate the Muslims and, making various excuses, did not want to help and did not help the Armenians to take the region of Kars under their control.
In December of 1918, the Armenian forces tried to free Nakhijevan from its Turkish-Tatar occupation but met with Muslim resistance at Sharur. Armenian forces managed to take the city of Nakhijevan only in May of 1919, with the support of British forces.
Elated by the rapid turn events the Armenian government planned to bring Sharur-Nakhijevan into the republic as a separate province, subdivided into the districts of Goghtan (Ordubad), Nakhijevan, and Sharur with the respective administrative centers in the towns of Agulis, Nakhijevan, and Bash-Norashen. Gevorg Varshamyan was named to serve as the first governor. A special committee composed of Varshamyan, Prime Minister Alexander Khatisyan, Dro, and General Hakhverdyan finalised the details of the annexation even though unanimity of opinion on procedure was lacking.
The arrangement to extend Armenia’s jurisdiction over Nakhijevan was made public on May 3 in a declaration signed by Dro and witnessed by British General Davie. “The war is over,” it began, “the sufferings and torture of the people must come to an end”. By the decision of the Allies and the Armenian government, divisions of the Yerevan detachment, headed by Dro, were to proceed to Nakhijevan to secure peaceful conditions for all inhabitants. Dro demanded unwavering discipline from his men: “I address you, troops under my command. You are representatives of the government. You must protect life and property of all citizens of the republic without distinction of nationality.”
On May 13, 1919, Khatisyan and Davie took governor-designate Gevorg Varshamyan and his staff aboard a train, passing by General Shelkovnikov’s column, as it pressed onto Sharur, and sped ahead to Nakhijevan. From Nakhijevan, Khatisyan and Davie traveled southwards all the way to the frontier with Persia. This vital route to the outside world finally stood open to Armenia. At Julfa, Khatisyan wired salutations to the Persian Prime Minister Vosuqed-Dowleh, who replied by extolling the traditional bonds between Armenia and Persia and welcoming the Republic of Armenia as a neighbour. Khatisyan returned to Yerevan on May 16, leaving Governor Varshamyan to begin his prodigious duties. Four days later the first company of Armenian soldiers entered Nakhijevan.
However, Nakhijevan remained under the control of the republic of Armenia for only less than two months. “In July of 1919, the Armenian authority had had serious failures in Nakhijevan where an Armenian prefecture had been established. There was a small Armenian force there but the population, which was almost completely Muslim, was under the influence of Turks and Azerbaijanis,” writes Simon Vratsyan, Armenia’s last Prime Minister.
One of the ministers, Artashes Babalyan adds, “In spring of 1919 British forces captured Sharur and
Nakhijevan and handed the authority of those two provinces to us. We barely managed to keep them for two months. The local Tatar population, having Turkish officers as leaders, rebelled on July 23, and our forces were obliged to retreat towards Yerevan, with heavy losses. There were no British forces at the time of the rebellion, and that was the reason why the Muslims rebelled and attacked our forces and gained power. Our government’s appeals and urgent requests to keep the small British force in Nakhijevan for a little longer were in vain.”
According to Vratsian, “For the British, the destiny of Karabakh as well as Zangezur had been determined. They had decided to unite those lands with Azerbaijan. On January 15, 1919, with Thomson’s approval, Azerbaijan appointed Khosrov Bek Sultanov, viewed by the Armenians as an Armenian hater and murderer, as the Governor General of Karabakh-Zangezur. On January 25, immediately after receiving the news, Armenia’s Foreign Affairs Minister (Sirakan) Tigranian sent a terse protest to Azerbaijan’s government announcing that Karabakh and Zangezur were an inseparable part of Armenia. Azerbaijan’s government responded that those “regions are an indisputable and inseparable part of Azerbaijan.”
Armenian-Muslim battles were continuing in Karabakh and Zangezur. The British suggested exchanging populations as a solution. The Armenians in Karabakh would be transferred to the region of Yerevan and the Muslims, from there to Karabakh.
According to Khatisyan, “The issue of population exchange was frequently placed on the table. It was not resolved through peaceful agreement, but as a result of spontaneous incidents and bloody inter-ethnic fighting. This is how Zangezur became exclusively Armenian and free of its heavy Muslim population. It was as a result of this change that Zangezur joined Armenia and is within the borders of Soviet Armenia today.”
If the British had helped Armenia to take Kars and Nakhijevan under their control, then they were doing everything for Karabakh to be subject to Azerbaijan.
Taking into account the existing difficulties and its resources, Armenia was in favor of an interim resolution of the Karabakh issue. This is confirmed in one of the documents of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. “The majority of the population in the mountainous part of Karabakh is Armenian and it is natural that their sympathy is towards Armenia. On the other hand, from an economic point of view, the Armenians of Karabakh are linked to Baku and the Turkish population of Karabakh’s low-lying region, with their animal herds, needs Karabakh’s mountains. In these circumstances, the unification of the region to Armenia or Azerbaijan can result in serious difficulties. Thus, some other way needs to be found for the resolution of the Karabakh issue.”
In autumn 1919, the Ninth General Meeting of the ARF took place in Yerevan. The party congress had criticized the Dashnaktsutyun’s Bureau and the Armenian government for their passivity regarding Karabakh. The newly elected Bureau was directed to take immediate steps to ensure Karabakh’s inclusion into the Armenian republic. According to Vratsian, maximalist aims prevailed during the meeting which “did not correspond either to the objective conditions of our country or to the capabilities of our nation.” “The necessity to establish friendly relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan was so important for Armenia that it would have been wiser for us to be a bit reserved in this issue, especially since it was impossible to disagree with the idea that Karabakh is of more vital importance for Azerbaijan than for Armenia and that Azerbaijan would hardly compromise on this issue without severe external pressure.”
According to Khatisian, “The issue of Karabakh was simply poisoning relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 1919 Sultanov occupied Karabakh without taking into consideration the will of the local representative meeting and by doing so provoked the Armenians in Karabakh. With the aim of reaching an agreement, I set up a meeting with Usubbekov, representative of Azerbaijan’s government, in Tiflis. On November 23 we drafted ‘the agreement’, which envisaged an intermediate resolution.”
Back in December, 1919, General Dro had been appointed as general commander of Zangezur and Karabakh. Dro had to reconstruct and reinforce Karabakh’s resistance, capture the whole of Karabakh and unite it with Armenia. Shortly after Dro’s arrival, Njdeh also moved to Karabakh with his Kapan military unit and set up position in the Dizak region.
On April 28, 1920, Soviet rule was established in Azerbaijan and Nariman Narimanov headed the Soviet government. Baku informed the local Armenian leaders that Karabakh was a part of Soviet Azerbaijan. On April 30, Armenia’s government received an ultimatum, “to clear Karabakh’s and Zangezur’s territory of troops and stop the inter-ethnic massacre,” otherwise, “Azerbaijan’s Revolutionary committee would consider itself in a state of war with Armenia.”
Nakhijevan was not mentioned in the ultimatum since the region had not been under Armenian control as of mid-1919. On May 1, 1920, a similar ultimatum was received, signed by the infamous Bolshevik Sergo Orjonikidze. Foreign Affairs Minister Hamo Ohanjanyan responded that Armenian armies had not been and are not on Azerbaijan’s territory and that, on the contrary, “to date the armies and bands of the Musavat government continue to stay in the region of Armenian Karabakh, massacring the Armenian villagers and burning the Armenian part of the city of Shushi and numerous villages.”
In May 1920, the representatives of Orjonikidze came to negotiate with Dro. The latter sent a telegram to Armenia’s Ministry of Military Affairs: “The representatives of the Bolsheviks came from Shushi. They informed me that they intend to bring the Red Army to Karabakh, and that Karabakh, up to the Hakari River, must belong to Soviet Azerbaijan.”
On May 24, a consultation between the officials from Armenia- Dro, Njdeh, Dmitry Mirimanyan, and Arsen Mikaelyan – took place in Chanakhchi (Avetaranots) village. It was decided to hand over Karabakh’s authority to the Armenian Bolsheviks. At the end of May the Armenian military unit, headed by Dro, passed through Kirs and then on to Zangezur.
In Kars
With the help of British military forces, Kars became part of Armenia in May, 1919.
On January 8, 1919, an agreement was signed between General George Forestier-Walker, Commander of the Allied Forces (Entente) in the Western Transcaucasus and Sirakan Tigranyan, Armenia’s Foreign Affairs Minister, according to which, pending the signing of the final Armenian-Turkish peace agreement, a British military governor was to be appointed in Kars. The civilian authority was envisaged to be exclusively formed of Armenians: to be more precise, a solely Armenian authority from Alexandrapol to Kars, a mixed one in Kars, and a Turkish-British one on the border, under the supervision of the military governor.
Based on the agreement signed between Forestier-Walker and Tigranyan, the British military governor and the Armenian civil authority left for Kars. However, the Turks greeted the Armenians with such hostility and threats, that the British advised the Armenian officials to leave for Alexandrapol.
From April 1919, the policy of the British Command in the Transcaucasus drastically changed in favour of the Armenians. With the agreement of the Armenian government and the British High Command, it was decided to seize the city with joint Armenian-British forces. Colonel Clive Errington Temberley was appointed military governor of Kars and on April 12, Stepan Ghorghanyan [Korganyan] was appointed civilian governor. Armenian and British forces moved forward by train and road and entered Kars on April 24 without meeting any resistance.
On May 2 the Arpachay-Sarighamish railroad fell into the hands of the Armenians. Regular transport began. On May 9 the Armenian forces captured Merdenek. On May 13 they entered Olti and Kaghzvan [Kagziman] without a fight. On May 10 Prime Minister Alexander Khatisyan and Brigadier General Keith Maitland Davie were welcomed to Kars with festivities. A national blessing took place in the historic monastery of Holy Apostoles where in his speech Khatisyan announced, “Our forces must capture the Alashkert valley and Basen by May 15.”
In mid-September, 1920, the Turkish armies re-occupied those territories which had come under the control of the Armenian armies in June – the region of Olti, with its coal mines.
From September 27-30, the Turks also captured the Armenian part of Ardahan (the northern part was under Georgian control) and Merdenek. On September 30, Kaghzvan handed to the Turks, without a shot being fired. At the end of October, Karabekir’s armies occupied Kars almost without resistance.
Andrei Sakharov’s proposal
As far back as 1988, a group of human rights activists headed by Andrei Sakharov proposed an alternative of territorial “separation” of the Armenians and Azerbaijanis as a model for the resolution of the conflict. At that time this proposal failed to become a subject of discussion.
Mentioning that Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov had also suggested the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue via the exchange of territories, Heydar Aliyev said in 2002, “When Sakharov came to Baku at the end of 1988, there were discussions about handing Meghri over to Azerbaijan and opening a corridor from Lachin to Armenia. Azerbaijan did not agree with that. I was informed about this proposal in Turkey by Özal and, later, Demirel. I cannot say whether or not Armenia would have finally agreed. However, the Azerbaijani side was completely against it.”
Turgut Özal’s proposal
Cengiz Çandar, the famous journalist and an aide to President Özal recalls, “In 1991 Özal sent me to Baku with a proposal, with which he tried to ascertain Mutalibov’s flexibility in the NK issue. The essence of that proposal was the exchange of territories. The war had just begun. According to that proposal, Azerbaijan forfeited Lachin and a part of NK to Armenia and the other part of NK, including Shushi, as well as Meghri, was handed over to Azerbaijan. Mutalibov said that he could not accept the proposal. I thought that he was taking into consideration the Iranian factor. Mutalibov’s explanation was different. He said that Zangezur had been Azerbaijani soil and Stalin had handed it over to Armenians. Why should we exchange Azerbaijani Lachin for Azerbaijani Zangezur?”
On April 28, 1992, in the Oval Office President Bush met with Özal. High ranking American and Turkish officilas were present.
Confidential, The White House, Washington, President Bush meeting with President Turgut Özal
Presisent Özal: I have an idea. Nagorno Karabakh is 80 percent Armenian and 20 percent Azeri. They could swap territory, with Nagorno Karabakh going to Armenia and Azerbaijan getting the piece of Armenia that separates the two parts of Azerbaijan. Stalin created the borders down here. He divided Azerbaijan to give it to the Armenians to buy them off.
Secretary Baker: What would happen to the Armenians in the southern part that you would give to Azerbaijan?
Presisent Özal: All together, not more than 50,000 people would have to be moved. Otherwise, this war will continue forever… They [Azerbaijan] need a corridor. This would also benefit Armenia. There is another reason to do this. The Central Asian republics need a connection to Europe… With my plan, there could be a connection through Azerbaijan to Turkey and to the Europe. These states need lines of communication to Europe that don’t go through Russia.
Secretary Baker: Would the Azeris be interested? Let us know. We might be willing to follow up.
Paul Goble’s idea
The 1992 idea of exchanging territories came from former US State Department employee Paul Goble. In April 2001 when, with the active support of the US, negotiations were being carried out in Key West, Florida, Goble’s idea essentially served as the basis of the settlement, but of course with notable amendments and modifications.
Goble thought that, “In principle there are three ways ‘to solve’ the Nagorno-Karabakh problem: to oust or kill all Armenians living there now, to station a great number of foreign forces to move these sides apart, or to hand over the NKAO to Armenian control.”
But Goble himself felt that all these options were impossible to realise: the first option because of moral considerations, the second because it was not physically possible, and, “The third one is impossible politically since, in this case, Azerbaijan will become the side unfairly treated both from the viewpoint of loss of territory and the question of water supply to Baku”.
Therefore, he sought the key to the resolution of the problem in the exchange of territories. First, handing over a part of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to Armenia together with the territories of the sources of rivers flowing in the direction of Azerbaijan. Secondly, handing over the Armenian territory connecting the Republic of Azerbaijan proper with Nakhijevan to Baku.
Later, in June 2000, Goble accepted making two miscalculations. The first regarded the water flow from Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan, which is not of such importance. The second, and more significant miscalculation, was minimising the importance for Armenians and Armenia of having a border with Iran. “In 1992 there was very little trade along that route and I thought it vital that the Armenians would surrender that [border] for peace. Now I understand its psychological meaning, i.e., that it is important not only for the future development of trade, but in particular, as a door to the non-Turkish part of the world,” Goble wrote. “At that time, I underestimated that factor. If I review that project today, I would first suggest that Azerbaijan concede a small part of western Nakhijevan, so that Armenia could have a border with Iran and for Turkey to open its borders with Armenia.”
In April 2001 when, with the active support of the USA, negotiations were being carried out in Key West, Florida, Goble’s idea essentially served as the basis of the settlement; of course, with noticeable amendments and modifications.
What Levon Ter-Petrosyan Revealed
On February 2008, Ter-Petrosyan, in front of tens of thousands of citizens gathered in Freedom Square, quoted from the document “hidden for ten years” and labeled it as the “biggest conspiracy against Armenia.”
Ter-Petrosyan read two articles from the Meghri and NK exchange document.
“The former NKAO and the regions of Shushi and Lachin are to be handed over to Armenia and the Meghri region with 1988 borders is to be handed over to Azerbaijan. Immediately after putting the agreement into force, the safe and voluntary relocation of the residents of the Meghri and the present-day Armenian residents of Aghdam, Fizuli, Jebrayil, Ghubatli, Zangelan and Kelbajar regions to the territory of Armenia will begin. This conspiracy was thwarted in Armenia because of two people. They were Karen Demirchyan and Vazgen Sargsyan. They thwarted that project and paid with their lives.”
Robert Kocharyan on the Meghri Alternative
In February 2008, in response to Ter-Petrosyan’s accusations, Kocharyan said, “The alternative of handing over Meghri was Paul Goble’s suggestion, which was periodically being put into circulation. This version entitled, “Principles of exchanging territories”, was discussed with the representative of one of the Co-chair countries only once. Had the response been positive, it would have later been developed and turned into a Minsk Group proposal. That alternative was rejected by both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides. During our administration, we have rejected the principles of exchanging territories, reasoning that we cannot lose the border with Iran. I have never seen that paper, which Ter-Petrosyan is waving about.”
On February 12, 2008, Vardan Oskanian, then the Armenian Foreign Minister, wrote off Ter-Petrosyan’s ‘revelations’ to exchange Meghri with NK simply as Goble’s project that was circulated in the early 1990’s and flatly and finally rejected in 2000. Oskanian emphasized that the Minsk Group had never presented such a proposal. He insisted that in 1994, Armenia’s authorities discussed Goble’s plan behind closed doors and that Ter-Petrosyan had stated that if the northern part of Nakhijevan, immediately adjacent to Armenia, all the way to Iran’s border was given to Armenia, it would be an acceptable alternative.
Kocharyan and his supporters deny any discussions on exchange of Meghri region. According to Kocharyan, he discussed with Heydar Aliyev the issue of providing a route to Azerbaijan via Meghri.
In his 2018 book “Life and Freedom”, Robert Kocharyan writes that the treaty was intended to be signed in Key West in 2001, but at the last moment Azerbaijan refused to sign it. Under the agreement, the liberated territories were also returned to Azerbaijan.
Nevertheless, in another passage of the same book, Kocharyan acknowledges that there have been discussions about giving the Meghri region in return for Lachin. He writes that in 1999 Heydar Aliyev offered to recognize Karabakh as Armenian along with the corridor connecting it with Armenia. “But in return, along with the return of the regions taken by us around Karabakh during the war, he offered to exchange territories. It was about the Meghri region of Armenia, which separates Azerbaijan from Nakhichevan. We considered such an exchange absolutely unacceptable because of the loss of the border with Iran.”
During a meeting with the Armenian community in Glendale in 2000, Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian also spoke about a proposal to exchange territories. “Meghri is given to Azerbaijan, Lachin is given to Armenia along with Karabakh. Together with Meghri, Armenia is given a sovereign road by which Armenia can have sovereign communication with Iran.” Oskanian added that “there is some logic” in this suggestion and “should be seriously discussed”.
Former Prime Minister Aram Sargsyan told that at the Security Council meeting in 1999, Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian presented several “Meghri options”.
According to the first, the Meghri region, with Meghri town and Agarak settlement, shall be exchanged for the Lachin corridor. The occupied territories of Karabakh shall be returned to Azerbaijan, the independence of Karabakh shall be recognized.
According to the second option, Agarak becomes a point zero. The status issue will be decided later by a referendum. Armenia loses its border with Iran.
The third option, according to Aram Sargsyan, was that the point zero was moving to the mountain pass where there was no population. The Azeris were allowed to cross through the point, Armenians could pass through the control of the border troops. The status issue would be resolved in a phased manner.
In the summer of 2000, during a meeting with a European diplomat, a high-ranking Armenian official explained:
“After the October 27 events the peace talks were interrupted… Currently, there are several official proposals to the solution on the table and one unofficial that suggests swap of territories. The last proposal has been actively persuaded by the US, but because of its significant geostrategic consequences it was rejected by Armenia and is now out of table. Azerbaijan as well was not very positive about that, although for it this proposal has a twofold meaning: from one side it loses Nagorno Karabakh from another – gets back all the occupied territories, except Lachin and acquires common border with Turkey… For Armenia it is much worse: in terms of territory, we can gain more than are supposed to give, but it is done at the expense of our strategic interests because we are losing the border with friendly Iran…”
We read in another confidential document that Steve Sestanovich prepared a new option of swap of territories.
In 1999, the possibility of settling the NK conflict by a territorial swap was once again circulated. Robert Kocharyan explained, “There is a dead-end and the only way out of the dead-end is to discuss all possible versions. And in that context, yes, there was the idea of exchanging territories. The idea differed considerably from what was printed in our media, but nevertheless, I did not accept that version and the current heated discussions are simply senseless. I must say that the version had its rationale. Supposedly it would have resulted in long lasting peace in the region.”
Vagharshak Haroutunyan also confirmed that the territorial swap had been seriously discussed. “As defense minister, I participated in the discussions of that document. It was Vazgen Sargsyan who informed me about the Meghri version the first time. After that, during the meeting between Kocharyan and Aliyev and Abiyev and me, Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister talked about it in Sadarak. Kocharyan then presented that version to me and said that it was a good solution. Afterwards, I met with the Minsk Group Co-chairs. Aram Sargsyan has also held discussions concerning this issue with the Co-chairs.”
Vazgen Sargsyan on Meghri
The attack of October 27, 1999 occurred as these discussions were continuing. Before the attack, Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan spoke explicitly against any discussion of providing a corridor through Meghri during a visit to Siunik in August, saying:
“Meghri is not a geographical unit, it is not simply a part of the homeland. When you give Meghri to anyone else, you are closing the door to your own home on yourself… I mean to say, Meghri is more important than anything else. Through its rocky and rugged landscape, Meghri brings the powers of the world to this country’s doorstep. To give Meghri away today, even if it means getting access to the sea in exchange, is a lie. A huge, global lie. Firstly, they’ll never give that access. There are a thousand ways to deny it. Karabakh is proof that lands are not taken by pens… I warn you, Meghri will blow up one day right in the centre of Yerevan.”
Even though the territorial swap and proposals based on the concept were unacceptable to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, they have been discussed during different phases of the negotiations. Azerbaijan was striving to create a direct land link with Nakhijevan; however, it was obviously not ready to compromise on the NK and Lachin issues. On the other hand, Yerevan wanted to see NK and the Lachin corridor within Armenia’s framework, but for security and other reasons it was not ready to give up its border with Iran.
In Istanbul
The negotiations between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan which began in Washington, in April 1999, continued in other countries. In July, the Aliyev-Kocharyan meeting in Geneva was noteworthy since it resulted from the joint initiative of the two presidents. In August, another Kocharyan and Aliyev meeting took place in Geneva. In September, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan negotiated in Yalta and on the Armenia-Nakhijevan border in October. After this last meeting, in a letter addressed to Kocharyan and Aliyev, U.S. Vice President Albert Gore encouraged their efforts and expressed the hope that if the two presidents managed to complete this stage of their work before the OSCE Istanbul summit in November, then “the entire OSCE will express its support of the progress achieved.”
However, Kocharyan and I did not support the idea of conditioning the NK peace process with the Istanbul summit; “especially from a geographical point of view the location is not very appropriate for Armenians.” In Istanbul, Kocharyan had already denied the news that a peace agreement was about to be signed during the summit, but that it was supposedly hindered by the tragedy which had taken place in Armenia’s parliament. “The issue has not matured and it was not even envisaged that a document concerning the settlement was to be signed here.”
On October 20, 1999, a month before the OSCE summit, Stephan Sestanovich, an aide to the US Secretary of State and Cary Cavanaugh, the American Minsk Group Co-chair meet with Kocharyan and other Armenian officials, including Vazgen Sargsyan. The next day Sestanovich and Cavanaugh continued the NK negotiations in Baku. Three days after these meetings, Foreign Affairs Minister Tofik Zulfugarov and Eldar Namazov, one of the most important figures in Aliyev’s administration, resigned. Another important official, Vafa Guluzade had resigned earlier.
Both Zulfugarov and Namazov confirmed that at a particular stage in the peace talks the sides had seriously considered a possible territorial swap. That happened prior to the Istanbul summit when, both men point out, “the idea of a territorial swap was in the air.” The two former officials said they resigned to protest a peace proposal that ran counter to Azerbaijan’s interests. “Prior to the Istanbul summit, agreements were reached that were not suitable for Azerbaijan’s interests. These agreements amounted to granting NK independence, not de jure of course, but de facto,” said Namazov.
According to Aliyev, “… it proved possible to bring the positions very close in October 1999. But after the terrorist act in the Armenia parliament, Armenia gave up on the little agreement we reached.”
It is hard to affirm which side rejected the little agreement the day before the Istanbul summit. It is not clear how close they were to an agreement. Information is also contradictory on what the link was between the terrorist act in Armenia’s parliament and the settlement.
On October 26, 1999 Aliyev met with Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State. On the morning of October 27, Kocharyan had a telephone conversation with Yeltsin. On the same day the Armenian president met with Talbott. A few hours later, when the American delegation was traveling from Yerevan to Ankara via Moscow in order to continue the NK discussions, shots rang out in Armenia’s National Assembly.
The allegation that the terrorist act was connected with the NK settlement was based on this coincidence. Moreover, opinions were circulating that Vazgen Sargsyan and Karen Demirchyan had been against the territorial swap.
“A few days before the incident, Karen told Stepan and me that it had been decided to open a road through Meghri. He said that everybody agreed. They were even happy, because large sums of money had been promised and they thought they could improve conditions in Armenia with that money. Vazgen joined Karen very soon. He became convinced that it was not right to hand over Meghri. He used to say that they could not convince him because handing over Meghri would put an end to Armenia”, says Rima Demirchyan.
American retired diplomat Peter Rosenblatt, who visited the region several times in 1999, has insisted, “The day before the October 27 dreadful massacre, Prime Minister Sargsyan completely agreed with Kocharyan. That is what I was told. I met with Sargsyan a few days before the murder and I got the impression he did not disclose everything concerning the negotiations, but those who were with Sargsyan during the last days of his life tell me that he completely agreed with Kocharyan.”
The timing of the killings, just after Strobe Talbott had met Vazgen Sargsyan, was certainly very striking, writes Thomas de Waal. Talbott was later quoted as saying that the two sides were “very, very close” to agreement and called the massacre “a human, political, and geopolitical catastrophe.” “One line of speculation was that the attackers had been instructed to prevent an imminent breakthrough on NK by getting rid of Sargsyan, who was now prepared to support a peace deal. Yet several other clues suggest that the timing was a coincidence and that the killings probably had a domestic political motive. Throughout the all-night vigil in parliament, the Hunanyan brothers did not mention NK. If someone had planned to derail the NK peace process, then Sargsyan was not the obvious first target – it was not yet known that he had actually signed on to a peace agreement.”
October 27 and the “Exchange of Territories”
On October 26, 1999, Aliyev received US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, as well as Sestanovich and Cavanaugh. On the morning of October 27, Kocharyan had a telephone conversation with Yeltsin. That same day, the American delegation flew in from Baku and met with the Armenian president in Yerevan.
The negotiations lasted over five hours. Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian also participated in them. Immediately after that meeting, Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan rushed to the National Assembly, while Oskanian accompanied the American delegation to the airport. A short while later, while the American delegation was en route to Ankara via Moscow in order to continue discussions on Karabakh with the Turkish authorities, shots were heard in the National Assembly of Armenia.
This coincidence is the reason for the claim that the terrorist attack had something to do with the resolution to the Karabakh conflict. What is more, the opinions being circulated highlighted that opposition to this alternative to the resolution – that is, involving territorial exchange – primarily came from Vazgen Sargsyan and Karen Demirchyan.
On October 26, 1999 Aliyev met with Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State. On the morning of October 27, Kocharyan had a telephone conversation with Yeltsin. On the same day the Armenian president met with Talbott. A few hours later, when the American delegation was traveling from Yerevan to Ankara via Moscow in order to continue the NK discussions, shots rang out in Armenia’s National Assembly. The allegation that the terrorist act was connected with the NK settlement was based on this coincidence. Moreover, opinions were circulating that Vazgen Sargsyan and Karen Demirchyan had been against the territorial swap.
“A few days before the incident, Karen told Stepan and me that it had been decided to open a road through Meghri. He said that everybody agreed. They were even happy, because large sums of money had been promised and they thought they could improve conditions in Armenia with that money. Vazgen joined Karen very soon. He became convinced that it was not right to hand over Meghri. He used to say that they could not convince him because handing over Meghri would put an end to Armenia”, says Rima Demirchyan.
American retired diplomat Peter Rosenblatt, who visited the region several times in 1999, has insisted, “The day before the October 27 dreadful massacre, Prime Minister Sargsyan completely agreed with Kocharyan. That is what I was told. I met with Sargsyan a few days before the murder and I got the impression he did not disclose everything concerning the negotiations, but those who were with Sargsyan during the last days of his life tell me that he completely agreed with Kocharyan.”
The timing of the killings, just after Strobe Talbott had met Vazgen Sargsyan, was certainly very striking, writes Thomas de Waal. Talbott was later quoted as saying that the two sides were “very, very close” to agreement and called the massacre “a human, political, and geopolitical catastrophe.” “One line of speculation was that the attackers had been instructed to prevent an imminent breakthrough on NK by getting rid of Sargsyan, who was now prepared to support a peace deal. Yet several other clues suggest that the timing was a coincidence and that the killings probably had a domestic political motive. Throughout the all-night vigil in parliament, the Hunanyan brothers did not mention NK. If someone had planned to derail the NK peace process, then Sargsyan was not the obvious first target – it was not yet known that he had actually signed on to a peace agreement.”
In the months preceding and following the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November, 1999, there were numerous articles in the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and international media about negotiations discussing the prospects of exchanging Meghri and Lachin. Meghri would be handed over to Azerbaijan, Lachin, along with Karabakh, would go to Armenia. A sovereign route through Meghri would be provided to Armenia for a direct link with Iran, that is, without crossing into Azerbaijani territory.
In Key West
The Lachin corridor became a subject of discussion once again in 2000-2001, when Robert Kocharyan and Heydar Aliyev were negotiating. Yerevan demanded that the Lachin corridor have the same status as Artsakh, that is, not part of Azerbaijan proper. Aliyev proposed in turn a corridor for Azerbaijan to access Nakhichevan, having the same status as the Lachin corridor. Moreover, Aliyev demanded that Azerbaijan have a corridor towards Shoushi, where Azerbaijani refugees were meant to return.
In a meeting with President Robert Kocharyan and other Armenian officials in Yerevan in July, 2001, Russia’s deputy foreign minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov said:
“We will focus on three main issues;
return of Azeri refugees to Shushi,
Azerbaijan’s link with Shushi,
Azerbaijan’s access to Nakhichevan via Meghri.”
We present the records of another meeting, which took place between Secretary of State Colin Powell and high-ranking Armenian officials in the spring of 2001. This conversation took place before Key West in April 3-6, 2001.
Four main principles were under discussion:
- the status of Artsakh,
- how Armenia would have access to Artsakh,
- how Azerbaijan would have access to Nakhichevan,
- and the issue of the return of Azerbaijani refugees to Shushi.
It was noted during the meeting that Armenia demanded a 20 km-wide corridor to guarantee unimpeded access to Artsakh, based not on the desire to take over Azerbaijani territory (because the additional land would be compensated with border areas of the former NKAO), rather for security reasons.
Azerbaijan demanded that its connection with Nakhichevan be determined through the principle of asymmetry, which was unacceptable for Armenia.
Yerevan was opposed to asymmetric corridors because Artsakh is an enclave – it does not have a border with a third country (all of the conflict resolution alternatives envisaged the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the areas around the Arax river, so Artsakh would lose its 100 km or so border with Iran), whereas Nakhichevan has borders with Turkey and Iran.
That is, if Armenian forces were to occupy the road or corridor connecting Nakhiյevan and Azerbaijan, then Nakhichevan would remain an exclave, keeping its shared borders with Turkey and Iran. But if Azerbaijani forces occupy the Lachin corridor, then Artsakh would once again become an island within Azerbaijan just as the NKAO was during the era of Soviet Azerbaijan.
Besides, if the Lachin corridor were handed over to Armenia, Azerbaijan would not be partitioned as a result. But if Azerbaijan were given territories in order to connect with Nakhiյevan, Armenia would be partitioned (if those territories were not along the Arax river). And if territories are given away in Meghri, along the Arax river, Armenia would lose its border with Iran and its access to that segment of the Arax river. Taking all of the above into consideration, Armenia concluded that it would be unacceptable to hand over territories or a corridor to Azerbaijan, but would not be against an overpassing elevated road of 40 kms connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan, which could be an Azerbaijani possession.
The Armenian side presented what was discussed at Key West during a meeting between EU delegates and the leadership of the Republic of Armenia held in the summer of 2001.
“The four element of the pachage are:
NK’s status,
Armenia’ access to NK,
Azerbaijan’s access to Shushi,
Return of refugees, mainly, to Shuhi.
We thought that we had reached certain agreements in Paris, to move on, but suddenly Aliyev backtracked and put new conditions.
On the status, we, basically, were getting the highest possible, similar to the one of the corridor. In exchange, they were getting free and unimpeded link to Nakhijevan, given that the status of their access was not similar to ours. Free and unimpeded implied that Azerbaijani cars would not be stopped on the way and not passing through the Armenian customs service. At Key West, Americans provided us with high-tech staff and maps to work on. It was envisaged that whether their road crossed Armenia’s populated areas and on the border with Iran, the road would be elevated. With this option, taking into account that the road’s certain portions would be on the ground. Armenia’s territory would be shortened at 8 meters.”
The last bit of this text is notable. Armenia’s territory would be reduced by 8 m, which means that the corridor given to Azerbaijan in Meghri would be 8 m wide along the Arax river. The areas containing Armenian villages would have elevated sections of the corridor.
A high-ranking Armenian official shared the following details in another discussion with a high-ranking European official, in October, 2001:
“The issue of the status of Artsakh is confidential. Not to be leaked to the press, but let me tell you that Artsakh was to be given to Armenia and the connection was to be made through the Lachin corridor, which was likewise to be given to Armenia. The security of those territories was probably going to be guaranteed through UN forces. The Azerbaijan-Nakhijevan connection was going to be made through Armenian territory, and this was where the disagreements lay. Aliyev wanted sovereign rights over that road, while the Armenian side was opposed.”
Although Kocharyan is accused nowadays of being ready to give Meghri away to Azerbaijan, that is far from the truth, to put it mildly. Kocharyan was negotiating for the road or corridor alternative to Azerbaijan through Meghri in 1999, 2000, and 2001. The Armenian side naturally expressed misgivings about endangering its land border with Iran during these discussions.
Taking Armenia’s and also Iran’s concerns into account, international mediators proposed an alternative: Armenia and Iran would have two roads over the Arax river. So there would be intersections at two points of the two corridors or roads connecting Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan as well as Armenia and Iran.
Summing up the discussions in 1999, we must note that the Armenian side rejected the Meghri alternative.
At Key West in 2001, the possibility of resolving the Karabakh conflict through the alternatives of providing corridors came up in the discussions once again. The rejection came from Baku this time.
Why?
One reason was that the international community was not proposing land access to Azerbaijan in order to connect with Nakhiյevan, but an elevated road. The proposal was to construct a 40 km-long overpass along the Arax river which would be placed under Azerbaijan’s sovereign authority.
That is, Azerbaijan would not have access to Nakhiյevan via land, through Armenia’s territory, but through Armenia’s airspace. So Armenia would not lose its border with Iran. In exchange, Azerbaijan would give up on the former NKAO and the Lachin corridor, which would become a part of Armenia.
However, the overpassing elevated road alternative was also set aside, and the Key West proposal as written down envisaged a “sovereign passage” along the Arax river for Azerbaijan to access Nakhichevan through Armenia’s territory.
This is the essence of Key West and the difference from the 1999 proposal which has come down in history as the Meghri or territorial exchange alternative.
April 6, 2020
