From Tatul Hakobyan’s book KARABAKH DIARY: BLACK and GREEN
Mamedrafi Mamedov, the Defense Minister of Azerbaijan, at the end of September 1993 went to Zangelan. “I understood that there was a lack of arms and armed forces. At that time all of the regions surrounding Zangelan were under occupation. The Armenians were waiting for the right time to occupy Zangelan, and when the opportunity arose, they did. At that time our armies were not ready for attacking actions. The population of Zangelan and the other regions should not have left their homes. They should have stayed and waged a partisan war.”18
On December 11, during a meeting broadcast on television, Aliev met with the heads and military commanders of the Azeri regions occupied by the Karabakh forces, demanding explanations from each and every one of them on why they ran away, ahead of the civilian population. Talking about the loss of Fizuli and Jebrail, Aliev blamed the commanders who, instead of defending the military front, were constructing houses in Baku. Aliev noted with bitterness that during the defense of the Zangelan region only 27 soldiers had died.19
Davit Shahnazaryan insists that only one thing was necessary in order to reach a ceasefire; Azerbaijan’s willingness, which was absent. “Immediately after coming to power Aliyev placed a military mission in front of him and began preparing for the December attack. Azerbaijan spent 100 million dollars; a fantastic amount number at that time,” Shahnazaryan claims. “Today the Azerbaijanis are talking about Russia’s support to Armenia, but in reality both Armenia and Azerbaijan received weapons from Russia. Russia always tried to maintain the balance. The only obstacle to establishing a ceasefire was Azerbaijan’s disinclination to do so and its policy to resolve the issue though military actions.”20
On October 14, 1993, the UN’s Security Council adopted the third Resolution (874) on NK, which “calls upon the parties concerned to make effective and permanent the ceasefire.” Azerbaijan rejected the resolution even though it envisaged the withdrawal of NK forces from the occupied territories. On the other hand, it assumed the removal of Azerbaijan’s blockade of Armenia and NK. In Baku they complained that they were being treated as “the defeated side.”21 Baku once again was handed a resolution, the adoption of which it initiated, but did not strive to implement. Aliyev was preparing for a new military attack along the length of the entire front, while the resolution was calling for an immediate halt to military and hostile acts.
On October 21, the Afghan mujahedeen detachment headed the surprise attack on the NK forces in the direction of Jebrail.22 The ceasefire was once again violated. Taking advantage of the situation, the NK forces initiated a new attack on the Azerbaijani troops and villages on the bank of the Araxes River. The ceasefire established though the efforts of the Russians lasted for 50 whole days, but, as Aliyev admitted during a telephone conversation with Kozirev, it was violated by the Azerbaijani side.
In December 1993, during a CSCE weekly meeting in Vienna, it was officially announced for the first time that Afghan mujahedeen were fighting in the war. “John Kornblum, the US Ambassador in the OSCE condemned the participation of the Afghan mujahedeen and considered it as a dangerous development,” says Armen Ayvazyan, Armenia’s representative to the OSCE at that time.23
On November 8, 1993 CNN announced that about 1000 Afghan mujahedeen were fighting against NK. According to Human Rights Watch, the Azerbaijani government had recruited Afghan mujahedeen soldiers. Official Baku denied these reports. Informed sources believed Afghan mercenaries numbered from 1,500 – 2,500. Their headquarters was reportedly near the village of Bash-Karvend, north of Aghdam. “Afghan men wearing military fatigue clothes are frequently seen in Baku. During Human Rights Watch’s March/April 1994 visit to Azerbaijan, staffers periodically saw groups of young men in a mix of traditional dress and combat fatigues at Hotel Azerbaijan in Baku. We also saw several Afghans in the courtyard of the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry and in the city of Barda. The Afghans first arrived in Azerbaijan in the fall of 1993. This was after Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Rovshan Javadov traveled to Afghanistan and arranged with then Prime Minister Golb Ed-Din Hekmatyar for Afghan fighters to come to Azerbaijan. The Afghans spearheaded an unsuccessful offensive in October 1993. After the offensive, NK forces captured documents in the Pashtun and Dari languages, photographs of the Afghan fighters at various locales in Azerbaijan, and lists of military terms translated from Azerbaijani into Dari. In addition, Turkish officers and retired American officers associated with an oil company reportedly trained Azerbaijani forces.”24
On December 22, 1993, Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan sent letter to Afghan President Brhan Ed-Din Rabani and Prime Minister Golb Ed-Din Hekmatyar, where he expressed concern on the involvement of Afghan mujahedeen on the side of Azerbaijani battalions within the NK conflict zone. Ter-Petrosyan expressed hope that that is happening without of knowledge of Afghan leadership and that they will pay attention to this fact. In his reply letter the Rabani mentioned: “I received and studied your letter related to certain irresponsible Afghans who are participants in the NK war. The Afghan side understands the concerns of the Armenian leadership. We have not sanctioned the participation of Afghan citizens in war activities in NK. The participation of a few mercenaries under the name of mujahedeen can not deteriorate the friendly relations which exist between Afghanistan and Armenia.”25
The involvement of the Afghan mercenaries did not save the Azerbaijani army from defeat. During the last week of October, the NK forces occupied Horadiz, Minjevan and the entire region of Zangelan. The assault of the NK forces towards the Araxes River took place during the visit of the CSCE Chairman-in-Office, Margaret aff-Uglas and the diplomats accompanying him, to Tbilisi, Baku and Yerevan.26
According to Human Rights Watch: “Before the start of the NK/Armenian offensive on October 23, NK authorities reportedly made radio broadcasts to the Azerbaijani population, ordering them to leave the area. Those who heard and heeded the warning were able to escape into Iran using the Horadiz Bridge. The bridge was subsequently destroyed by shelling and the refugees were forced to swim across the Araxes River to escape. Many drowned. An estimated 60,000 Azerbaijanis were forced to flee across the Araxes River into Iran.”27
On November 9, during a telephone conversation with Kocharyan, Kozirev urged a pull- back of forces to the October 20 positions or a symbolic pull out from one region. “I will work on the map for some time. The territories give room for flexibility,” is the response from Stepanakert. During a telephone conversation with Kozirev, Aliyev said, in an exasperated tone, that he has turned Azerbaijan’s face towards Russia, but did not receive any help during difficult times. He underlined that he had entered into communication with the leaders of NK, but Kocharyan is trying to dictate his terms.28
On November 12, 1993, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 884, its fourth and final one on the NK conflict. It condemned “the occupation of the Zangelan district and the city of Horadiz,” demanded from the parties concerned the immediate cessation of armed hostilities and hostile acts, the unilateral “withdrawal of occupying forces from the Zangelan district and the city of Horadiz, and the withdrawal of occupying forces from other recently occupied areas Azerbaijan.”
As Vafa Guluzade wrote later, the only consolation for Azerbaijan in the Security Council resolutions was that Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity was recognized. “Today, reading those resolutions, I am embarrassed for the authors. I do not have our diplomats in mind, because their appeals and entreaties for the condemnation of Armenia’s aggression remained a voice in the wilderness. Everything was being done in the Security Council to keep the impact away from Armenia and free it from the responsibility of the aggression.”29
But Kazimirov blamed Baku first. The Russian mediator had reached an agreement on a ceasefire with Aliyev and Kocharyan on December 17. The document was received from Stepanakert on time. Baku sent an empty message to Moscow only three days later and this latest attempt to establish ceasefire was dashed. Kazimirov writes that by delaying, Baku was probably preparing for an extensive counter-attack.
A large-scale Azerbaijani offensive that commenced in late December 1993 lasted until mid-February 1994. It was fought in depopulated areas, and thus had little direct effect on civilian populations. Combat, however, was especially fierce, and many believe there were abuses and even summary execution of prisoners of war.30
From December to the ceasefire in May 1994, the Armenian side suffered more than 2,000 deaths; the Azerbaijanis, more than 5,000. On November 17-18, 1993, with the mediation of the Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia, a meeting was held in Moscow between Vazgen I, Catholicos of all Armenians, and Sheikh-ul-Islam Allahshukyur Pashazade, leader of the Azerbaijani Muslims. The meeting did not stop the bloodshed.
According to Kazimirov, 1993 was the period of fierce military action in NK. There were no longer local battles, but a massive front line and mass military operations utilizing modern arms resulting in the seizure of large areas of land. “The Armenians took the initiative. In addition to the people of NK and volunteers from different countries, Armenia’s army was also fighting there. The other side had assembled different mercenaries, including many officers through the military commissariats in several of Russia’s regions, and about two thousand Afghan mujahedeen.”31
Mamedrafi Mamedov offers the following comments on the final, but bloodiest stage of the war. “We had a task – liberate the occupied territories. First, we planned to move forward about 50km and liberate the regions of Aghdam and Fizuli. Why didn’t we succeed? The reason was simple – our forces weren’t sufficient. Also, after moving forward 25 km in the direction of Horadiz and Beylagan, the soldiers and officers began abandoning their posts and we were forced to stop.”32
In the second half of December the situation worsened in the Beylagan region. The Russians were trying to establish a ten day ceasefire, hoping to extend it. The NK side gave its agreement, but Baku responded only three days later by sending a useless series of words with dubious signatures to Moscow. The Russian Ambassador in Paris informed Aliyev, in France on a visit, that despite the agreements reached, Baku had not sent a suitable document to Moscow. Aliyev promised to clarify things after his return to Baku. On December 23, within the framework of the CIS summit in Ashgabad, Ter-Petrosyan’s meeting with Aliev took place due to Saparmurad Niyazov’s mediation. At the end of the year Russia suggested that the parties to the conflict welcome in the New Year without gunfire. Stepanakert once again agreed; Baku did not even respond.
In the first days of January 1994, the Azerbaijani army launched an attack in three directions: Martakert-Kelbajar, Aghdam-Martuni and Horadiz. Azerbaijani forces retook the Horadiz train station. During the first week of January, the Azerbaijani forces managed to cleave and move about 15km depth and 5km wide towards the Hadrut direction. This was facilitated by the slipping of Azerbaijani diversionary groups through the territory of Iran to the rear of the NK forces.33
In the final ten days of January, the Azerbaijani army crossed the Omar mountain pass and surprised the Armenian forces. The Armenians lost about 100 lives in Kelbajar. “Our defense was very unorganized and neglected. The Vanadzor brigade was there. They had moved down from Omar and retreated, as if to set up a defense line in Seyidlar,” said Georgy Gasparyan, the Head of Artillery of NK’s Defense Army. “Our soldiers retreated in panic and stopping them was very hard. The panic was greater than the Azerbaijan’s success. We gathered the old guys and regained what we had lost. The Azerbaijanis were running in panic. We blocked their return route with fire. They left behind about 15 tanks and cannons of different gauge.”34
Samvel Babayan added: “It was a brilliant operation. Unfortunately we lost about two dozen men but, taking into account the size and complications of the actions, our losses could have been greater. The adversary had two recourses – either to surrender or remain in the snow. We took some of them hostage. The rest stayed in the snow or fled. The Azerbaijani brigade stationed in Kelbajar had more than 2500 soldiers. Let Baku say how many of them survived.”35 On February 18, the NK forces reached the Omar mountain pass, once again taking the whole region of Kelbajar under their control.
Tigran Khzmalyan returned to Yerevan after the Kelbajar operations. Trembling, he still recalls, “They handed me a sack to bring to Yerevan. That sack was full of military wallets of the deceased Azerbaijani soldiers. Before handing it over, I opened and looked at them. There were several hundred military wallets. Some of them had blood on them and there were traces of bullets on others. Those were the documents of 18 and19 year-old boys; childish faces. Seeing dozens of corpses is a difficult thing, but after a short while you become used to it. I had seen dozens of corpses, but the military wallets had an awful effect on me. Each of them was a story, different from the other. But the corpses were not different.”36
Mamedrafi Mamedov recounts, “In January 1994 we were in Mrav, on the mountain peak. There was snow all around us; impassable roads. How is it possible to conduct military operations in such a location? I was against it, but some leaders managed to convince the rest that an attack on Kelbajar would be successful. I publicly announced that the attack was going to fail. My arguments were ignored. How many did we lose? It is hard to say, but my soul aches and will continue to ache for the rest of my life for the dead soldiers and officers.”37
Photo – Mohammad Younas was among the thousands of Afghan fighters that Hezb-e Islami, a major Afghan Islamist party, sent to Azerbaijan in the 1990s to bolster Baku in its war against Armenians.
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An exceptional and informative work based on a rich and varied source base. Its impartiality is striking. A much needed monograph destined to persevere as the ‘textbook’ for Armenian diplomacy. As a pioneering initiative that presents an accurate reinterpretation of the Karabakh struggle for self-determination, this book captures the essence of the issue with an illuminating portrayal of many of the key figures and events that have come to define the Karabakh issue. The conflict cruelly shaped the destinies of thousands of average people and the ordeals they bore underline the responsibility of those at the top, in whose hands a resolution of the Karabakh conflict rests. The author’s secret, revealed in the pages of Green and Black, is that he does not shy away from presenting those facts and realties no longer considered expedient to remember. Anyone wishing to be informed and regarding the Karabakh conflict must read this book.
