Oskanian consistently and publicly worked against Armenia-Turkey protocols – WikiLeaks, 2010

1187

WikiLeaks-Armenia N 131

2010-02-25

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000098

SUBJECT: EX-ARMENIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PESSIMISTIC ON RAPPROCHEMENT WITH TURKEY

Classified By: Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch. Reasons 1.4(b & d)

——-

SUMMARY

——-

¶1. (C) Vartan Oskanian, Armenia’s foreign minister from 1998-2008, expressed skepticism to the Ambassador about the fate of the Turkey-Armenia protocols, and accused President Sargsian of mishandling the entire process. He suggested that Turkey, as the senior partner, make a unilateral move to get the protocols back on track. He also recommended that the Turks and Armenians talk directly, rather than through the media or third parties. In Oskanian’s view, the controversy surrounding the protocols has prevented any movement on Nagorno-Karabakh and even jeopardized its potential resolution. He said the key going forward will be how the GOAM [Government of Turkey] handles the expected failure of the  protocols — will the government simply allow them to languish, or will the GOAM be able to manage the process so that another effort at rapprochement can begin after a suitable interval. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with ex-Foreign Minister Oskanian on February 10 to discuss the current state of Armenia-Turkey relations, prospectrs for ratification of the protocols, and efforts to resolve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. After serving as foreign minister under President Kocharian, Oskanian now runs the Civilitas Foundation, an NGO that promotes civic involvement and institution building in Armenia.

——————————————–

ARMENIA – TURKEY RELATIONS AND THE PROTOCOLS

——————————————–

¶3. (C) Oskanian restated his concerns about the future of Armenia-Turkey rapprochement. While still opposed to the protocols’ content, he strongly believes that there must eventually be closure of some sort, and that the protocols cannot be allowed simply to languish through inaction. For if they do, it will be much harder to revive the process in the future. Oskanian said that Turkey will then demand more specifics and add more requirements that will make any future negotiations much more difficult. He is concerned that the GOAM will simply give up. According to Oskanian, the Turkish contacts of Civilitas also believe that the protocols will not move forward, absent Armenian concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh, such as the return of one or two of the occupied territories to Azerbaijan. Oskanian added that such a condition is a non-starter for Armenia.

¶4. (C) Oskanian criticized the manner in which President Sargsian has handled the entire process. In his view, the President “put the cart before the horse.” Oskanian did not understand why President Sargsian began the process with Turkey so publicly, and how unprepared he was for the negative public reaction. Prior to embarking upon normalization with Turkey, the GOAM had a document for solving the Nagorno Karabakh conflict — the Madrid Principles — that was promising to both sides. The President should have expended his political capital with Armenian citizens and the diaspora to persuade them that some of the Nagorno-Karabakh territories must be returned to Azerbaijan. With Nagorno-Karabakh settled, he could have then turned to the issues with Turkey. Oskanian said this had been his plan as Foreign Minister: first reach agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh, and then bring in Turkey. (Comment: This may have been the plan, but neither Oskanian nor ex-President Kocharian expended capital on promoting such compromises, nor did they consult the Armenian public, preferring to cloak the NK negotiations in the utmost secrecy. End Comment.)

——————————————

TURKS MUST BE THE FIRST TO MAKE A MOVE NOW

——————————————-

¶5. (C) In response to the Ambassador’s question on how to move the process forward, Oskanian responded that there must be some movement from Turkey, and that the protocols cannot be left in abeyance while the parties shift their attention to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. He believes the GOT must be the first to take action, perhaps opening the border for limited movement of pedestrian traffic or third-country nationals. However, based on Oskanian’s conversations with his Turkish contacts, the GOT is not offering room to maneuver and they are not interested in moving the process forward.  Oskanian argues that communication between Turkey and Armenia should not be occurring through the media or third parties. A reset to this process is needed, with additional high-level meetings between the presidents that would be kept confidential and focused on reaching an oral agreement.  (COMMENT: Few in Armenia, and perhaps not even Oskanian, expect that the GOT will make a unilateral move to end the current impasse. END COMMENT)

¶6. (C) The increasingly bellicose rhetoric from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is not helping matters with Turkey. In Oskanian’s view, Turkey and Azerbaijan are “tightening the screws” on Armenia from both sides. While a new war over Nagorno-Karabakh would be a risky proposition for Azerbaijan, Oskanian sees two elements that indicate the situation there is worsening: 1) people are losing hope in the diplomatic process to settle the issue; and 2) the military balance in the area is shifting in favor of Azerbaijan.

——————————————

HOW TO MANAGE THE FAILURE OF THE PROTOCOLS

——————————————

¶7. (C) The challenge that Oskanian now sees for the GOAM is managing the possible failure of the protocols. If it appears that the protocols will not be ratified by either country, then it would be best for the GOAM to admit that and try again later. The GOAM should manage the process and salvage what it can. It would be worse in his view if the GOAM simply allowed the process to collapse with no thought given to future steps.

¶8. (C) Salpi Ghazarian (Amcit, please protect), Director of Civilitas, added that the protocols are in trouble because the GOAM ignored the “two large elephants in the room” when negotiating the terms: the claim for recognition of the 1915 massacres as “genocide” and the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.  The GOAM and Turkey could not reasonably expect to move the protocols forward without addressing these issues. Oskanian agreed, arguing that the GOAM is now faced with two documents – the protocols and the recently revised Madrid Principles — that are detrimental to Armenia but from which neither Turkey nor Azerbaijan will retreat.

¶9. (C) While Oskanian believes that the GOAM will not ratify the protocols unless it is assured that the GOT will follow suit, he believed it would be best for President Sargsian to use his majority in the Armenian Parliament to ratify the protocols now, while there is still some support and there are no explicit links between the protocols and Nagorno Karabakh. He added that he takes no pleasure in the current predicament in which Sargsian finds himself: He truly hopes the protocols will be ratified by both sides. (COMMENT: This is a new line from Oskanian and hard to believe, as he has consistently and publicly worked against the protocols in Armenia and with the diaspora. END COMMENT)

————————————–

NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND THE MINSK GROUP

————————————-

¶10. (C) Oskanian vented that the protocols are preventing any resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. If not for the protocols, Oskanian said, he could see President Sargsian pushing for the return of five of the seven Nagorno-Karabakh regions to Azerbaijan while keeping the remaining two for future discussions. But now it would be “political suicide,” because such a move would be seen as giving credence to the conspiracy theories that claim there is a hidden provision in the protocols that link them to concessions on NK.

¶11. (C) On the Madrid Principles, the Ambassador reiterated the USG position that it is more beneficial to continue to move forward than to stop completely, which is what it appears Armenia is doing.  Oskanian said he understands that the revised Madrid Principles indicate clear linkages with all the territories, but do not provide status, a situation Armenia cannot accept. That said, he agreed that if the GOAM does not like the revised wording of the Madrid Principles, then it should propose its own revisions and not simply reject the principles out of hand. In Oskanian’s view, the GOAM should write its own proposal in such a way that is “logical,” and so the Minsk Group Co-Chairs will understand that Armenia is committed to the process even if the proposed revisions would be unacceptable to Azerbaijan.

¶12. (C) If the protocols do fail, Oskanian believes the Minsk Group will have to take a hiatus. But he sees pressure growing on President Aliyev to take action on Nagorno Karabakh. In his view, Azerbaijan will not accept indefinitely what it sees as an occupation of its territory. As for the original Madrid Principles, Oskanian said the GOAM had been satisfied with the wording, and it would not have been the end of the world if Armenia had been forced to accept it.

——-

COMMENT

——-

¶13. (C) On the outside looking in, Oskanian has been an early and forceful critic of President Sargsian’s normalization initiative with Turkey and his handling of NK. He did say, however, that recently he had been sharing views with someone “close to the process.” Hints from other sources suggest that that person may be former NK President Gukasian, who we have heard has become a close advisor to Sargsian, has played a role in healing the rift that had separated the President and his predecessor,  who was attempting to do the same with Oskanian. If the former Foreign Minister is in fact newly engaged and, to some extent, invested, perhaps those were not crocodile tears he was shedding for the foundering normalization process. While we retain our skepticism, we do hope that this impressive former diplomat just might be applying his intellect to creative problem-solving on the inside rather than sniping from without.

YOVANOVITCH