By April 1920, General Anton Denikin’s White Army was overwhelmingly defeated by the Red Army, which was moving towards the North Caucasus and then to the Transcaucasus.
At the end of April, Armenia’s leadership sent a delegation to Moscow, anticipating recognition by Russia. The delegation was headed by Levon Shant, deputy speaker of the parliament. Hambartzum Terteryan and Levon Zarafyan, both socialists ideologically, were delegation members. The Armenian delegation left Yerevan on April 30. The government instructed Shant’s delegation to enter into a treaty arrangement with Soviet Russia based on four fundamental principles: 1) recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the Armenian Republic, inclusive of Karabakh; 2) acceptance of the unification of Eastern (Russian) and Western (Turkish) Armenia; 3) non-interference in the internal affairs of the Armenian Republic;and 4) permission for Armenian refugees in areas under Soviet control to relocate to Armenia with all moveable belongings.
The delegation departed for Moscow and, on May 4, Prime Minister Hamazasp [Hamo] Ohanjanyan sent a telegram to Chicherin in which “independent, united, democratic Armenia” proposed that “socialist Russia enter into negotiations with it in order to establish contractual relations between the two republics, based on the principles of recognition of Armenian independence and sovereignty”. On May 17 Chicherin replied, “The Soviet government declares its agreement to sign a treaty establishing friendly relations between the two nations.”
The sovietisation of Azerbaijan had a strong ripple effect in the Transcaucasus and emboldened the Bolsheviks of Armenia to unfurl the flag of revolt. During the first days of May 1920, they incited a two-week rebellion in Armenia. Alexandrapol, Kars, Sarighamish, Basargechar, New Bayazet, and Dilijan were the centres of the revolt. The main group up in arms was the army. On May 5, in an extraordinary session of parliament, the resignation of Khatisyan’s government was accepted and the Bureau of the ARF Dashnaktsutyun, presided by Hamazasp Ohanjanyan, assumed the reins of authority. The riot was suppressed and several Armenian Bolshevik leaders were given the death penalty.
The work of suppressing the riots in almost all regions was given to the forces of General Sepuh [Arshak Nersisyan]. He firstly moved with his soldiers towards Alexandrapol, Kars and Sarighamish, where the Bolshevik riots were in a narrow area and limited to the involvement of certain military staff. The riots in the north-western parts of Armenia had only recently been suppressed when new ones lit up in Nor Bayazet, Dilijan, Ijevan and Zangezur. By mid-June, the Bolshevik riots were suppressed. The Bolsheviks, Tatars, and a group of collaborating Armenian officers and soldiers had captured Ijevan on June 20 and Shamshadin on June 23. However, towards the end of June, the enemy was driven out of Armenia’s borders by Sepuh.
Concurrently with the battles being fought under the command of Sepuh, following Zangibasar, the Armenian army began operations on the orders of Minister Ruben [Ter-Minasyan] to capture Vedibasar, Sharur-Daralagyaz, and the salt mines of Koghb and the coalmines of Olti.
The Bureau government, taking into account how close the Bolsheviks andKemalists were becoming, paid greater attention to the necessity of negotiating with Bolshevik Russia. Armenian-Russian negotiations had begun at the end of May.
Obviously Shant’s delegation had received a maximalist task, which was simply impossible to realise.
The first meeting between the two sides did not occur until late at night on May 28. Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin reaffirmed the desire for friendly mutual relations. He added, however, that the Soviet government had also decided to assist the Turks in their liberation struggle against the European colonialist powers. The Turks were worried that Armenia might try to subvert their supreme endeavour by striking from the rear. Soviet Russia, Chicherin continued, wished to reconcile Armenian-Turkish differences and that this objective would be facilitated by an Armenian pledge not to interfere in Mustafa Kemal’s campaign against the Entente Powers. Shant replied that his delegation was not empowered to discuss Armenian-Turkish relations but rather to gain Russian recognition of the independence of a united Armenian state inclusive of the Western Armenian provinces. Chicherin retorted that the Armenians had often been deceived by the European imperialists and apparently were again beguiled.
As historian Richard Hovannisian noted, “Chicherin seemed more interested in discussing Armenian-Turkish relations than addressing the primary issues on Shant’s agenda – unqualified Soviet recognition of Armenia’s independence, the boundary conflict with Azerbaijan, the future of Armenian institutions and refugees in Russia, and the development of economic relations.”
On June 3, Shant informed Yerevan that negotiations had begun and Chicherin had given firm assurances that there would be no attempt to force Soviet rule on Armenia. The Armenian delegation again met with Chicherin and Assistant Foreign Affairs Commissar Lev Karakhan (himself Armenian) during the second week of June. Shant announced that, in principle, Armenia was prepared to accept the good offices of the Soviet government, but he doubted that the Turkish nationalists would agree to a solution based on the proportion of Armenian and non-Armenian peasants who had lived on the lands of Turkish Armenia. Chicherin, who a few days earlier had answered Mustafa Kemal’s first official proposal for mutual collaboration with a pledge of co-operation and an offer to mediate between Turkey and Armenia, was gratified by Shant’s declaration and promised to do everything possible to secure for Armenia a substantial part of Western Armenia and an outlet to the Black Sea. Chicherin gave the Armenian delegation to understand that the Sovnarkom was tending toward recognising Zangezur and Nakhijevan as integral parts of the Armenian Republic, whereas Nagorno-Karabakh would be regarded as disputed, with its ultimate fate decided by plebiscite.
The upcoming visit of a Turkish delegation as well as protests of the Bolsheviks from the Transcaucasus to the Soviet leaders forced the pace of the negotiations to slow down. In an informal discussion with Terteryan, Karakhan even explored the possibility of Armenia’s relinquishing claims to the Turkish Armenian provinces in exchange for extensive territories in Transcaucaus. Terteryan was allowed to see a sketch map of Armenia that included not only the mountainous part of Karabakh, but Zangezur and Nakhijevan–territories in dispute with Azerbaijan–but also Akhalkalak, Akhaltskha, and much of Borchalu, together with a corridor to the port of Batum. On May 7, 1920, with the Soviet-Georgian treaty, all of the province of Tiflis was identified as part of Georgia, but Karakhan implied that this question was still open to negotiation.
How sincere Karakhan and Chicherin were remains unclear and even suspect.
At the same time, the delegation headed by Mirza Davud Huseinov, Soviet Azerbaijan’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, tried to hinder the Armenian-Soviet treaty, if Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhijevan were to be recognised as part of Armenia. On the other hand, the Armenian and Azerbaijani Bolsheviks, including Anastas Mikoyan and Avis Nurijanyan, reported to the Soviet leadership about complaints alleging that the Dashnaks had sent a delegation to Moscow for negotiations “while at the same time they were slaughtering communists without mercy”. At the end of June, Chicherin warned Shant that if anti-Bolshevik persecutions continue in Armenia, Russia would end the negotiations. Chicherin retreated from his previous proposals, now suggesting that Nakhijevan should go to Armenia and Karabakh to Azerbaijan, with Zangezur remaining in dispute.
Shant, the head of the Armenian delegation, has not written articles or left memoirs on the Moscow negotiations. Vratsyan’s request, directed at Shant that he set down the details of the Moscow negotiations, remains unfulfilled. In the months of May and June of 1925 Shant presents some detailsin his letters to Vratsyan. Shant describes Chicherin as “a liar and base.” “We came to agreement on all points with Karakhan. The treaty was not signed because the Armenian, Georgian, and Tatar communists in Baku began to use all means to put pressure on Moscow, insisting that Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhijevan, being Turkish lands, indisputably Turkish, there could be no discussion about unifying them with Armenia.”
Shant’s telegram of June 1 from Moscow says, “From the first meeting it became obvious that the only difficulty was the border with Azerbaijan, as Baku is attempting in every way to interfere with the signing of the treaty.” According to Shant’s information, the Russian government accepted that the Armenian demands were just, but the stubborn insistence of Azerbaijan slowed down the process of signing the treaty. Azerbaijan was taking advantage of the Russian Revolution and the presence of Russian forces to realise the Musavat agenda of capturing Zangezur and Karabakh. Shant saidthat the Moscow government was ready to act as mediator between Armenia and Mustafa Kemal.
Towards the end of June, Chicherin warned Shant that if the persecution of Bolsheviks in Armenia continued, Russia would cease negotiations. Terteryan writes that, during that meeting, Chicherin withdrew the previous proposals and presented new ones: to cede Karabakh to Azerbaijan, considering Zangezur disputed and uniting Nakhijevan to Armenia. He informed the Armenian delegation that the negotiations were to be interrupted and would continue in Yereven. Boris Legran, the plenipotentiary representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and diplomat of Soviet Russia’s Foreign Affairs Commissariat, would conduct the meeting for the Russian side.
The new formula created dissent within the Armenian delegation. Terteryan and Zarafyan were prepared to accept the proposal, which was predicated on the recognition by Soviet Russia of Armenia’s independence. Shant hesitated, insistingthat the delegation had been instructed to secure the inclusion of the mountainous part of Karabakh and had no mandate to compromise on that issue. Communications with Yerevan were slow and irregular. Conditions had changed drastically since the delegation had departed from Yerevan in April. Chicherin’s modified scheme would award Armenia the rich, strategic corridor over Nakhijevan to Persia and lay the ground for the incorporation of Zangezur. As for Karabakh, Armenia would have to rely on the strong will and determination of the mountaineers to resist Azerbaijan and eventually find a way to unite with Armenia. Shant, however, was intractable and insisted on sending a coded message to Yerevan to report and request new directives.
The disagreements within the Armenian delegation were minor compared with the differences inside the Soviet camp. Not only the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee (Revkom), headed by Nariman Narimanov and Mirza Davud Huseinov, maintained that the annexation of the Karabakh-Zangezur-Nakhijevan passageway was imperative to bolster the Baku government and forestall renewed anti-Soviet uprisings, but such prominent Bolsheviks as Orjonikidze tried to manipulate events to bring about a more aggressive stance toward Armenia and Georgia. After negotiations had begun with the Shant delegation, Chicherin telegraphed Orjonikidze to complain that the Azerbaijani comrades were hindering the process by expanding their pretensions even beyond Karabakh and Zangezur to include Sharur and Daralagiaz. Chicherin took the matter to the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee. In a further lengthy memorandum addressed to Lenin at the end of June, Chicherin noted that divisions of the Turkish army had reportedly advanced into Nakhijevan. The intent of the Kemalists was not clear, but there was no doubt that the Turks had been affected by the anti-Soviet manifestations in Azerbaijan. He advised that great care should be taken in dealing with prominent Caucasian comrades such as Orjonikidze, Narimanov and Budu Mdivani, who were disgruntled with the Central Committee and clamoured for the imposition of Soviet rule in Georgia and Armenia. Chicherin complained that even when ordered to desist, they continued in their provocative ways. Azerbaijan was demanding Karabakh, Zangezur, Sharur, and Daralagyaz, together with Nakhijevan, Julfa, and Ordubad, territories largely under the control of the Yerevan government and considered a part of Armenia. Russia’s role should be objective and impartial. Chicherin advised, “It would be a fatal mistake for the whole of our policy in the east if we begin to lean toward one national element against another national element.” Although the Politburo issued directives prohibiting the Red Army from advancing into Armenia, Soviet Russia nonetheless agreed that it was necessary to interrupt the negotiations with the Armenian delegation. The pressure of the Azerbaijani Revkom, as well as the fact that Foreign Affairs Minister Bekir Sami Bey of the Turkish Grand National Assembly was en route for consultations in Moscow, clearly contributed to this development.
When the Soviet mission was preparing to leave Moscow, Legran and his advisor Sahak Ter-Gabrielyan met with Shant’s delegation. Legran emphasised that Nakhichevan will pass to Armenia and, although it will temporarily be considered disputed territory, Zangezur will be recognised as an undisputable part of Armenia as well.
In the July 15 session of the Yerevan ARF Council of Representatives, Prime Minister Ohanjanyan reported that the negotiations between the Armenian delegation and Russia were progressing very slowly. “Armenia cannot help noticing the closeness between Kemal and Lenin. If Soviet Russia has decided to extend a hand to Turkey over the corpses of the Armenian nation and reach its intended goals at the cost of the annihilation of Armenia and if, as a result of the Kemalist and communist agreement, the Bolshevik rebels continue their insidious attacks on Armenia’s boundaries, then for us, Soviet Russia is an outright enemy state.”
It becomes obvious from the Russo-Turkish and Russo-Armenian negotiations of 1920 that, for Moscow, the establishment of friendly links with Turkey were of primary importance. The Turks were informing the Russians in detail of their intended steps towards the Armenians. The Kemalist delegation comprising Bekir Sami, parliamentarian Yusuf Kemal, and communist Fuad Sabit, had arrived in Moscow. In one of the Russian documents it says, “Negotiations were taking place with, on the one hand, the Turkish delegation and on the other hand the Armenian delegation headed by Shant. During negotiations with Khalil Pasha, the Soviet government had raised the principle of ethnographic borders and proposed the population exchange of the two peoples. On principle, the Dashnak government approved of that alternative but when the time came for clarification, it became clear that their pretensions were so great that it was impossible to come to a decision on the Armenian borders. Shant’s delegation left without achieving any results. The Turkish government decided to cut the Gordian Knot by the sword. The Dashnaks gave the Turks the opportunity to advance militarily.”
Terteryan wrote, “Zarafyan and I suggested that Shant have a private meeting with the Turkish delegation. He argued that, firstly, we were not authorised to negotiate with the Turks and, secondly, he would not sit side by side with the slaughterers of the Armenian nation.”
On July 21, 1920, Boris Legran travelled to Yerevan to continue the Russian-Armenian negotiations. Armenia’s authorities prohibited his entry and argued that, under the prevailing conditions he, together with his group, could not be considered as Russia’s official delegation and must pass inspection on the border, just like any other traveller. Upset by this behaviour towards Legran, Tigran Bekzadyan, Armenia’s representative in Tiflis, applied to Georgia’s government to invite Legran to Tiflis.
While Armenia’s authorities were delaying the meeting with Legran and awaiting the return of Shant’s delegation, the Azerbaijanis were fighting against Dro’s and Njdeh’s troops in Nakhijevan, Zangezur, and Kazakh, with the help of the Red Army. Dro left Goris on August 8, after two days of battle against the Soviet forces. The move disappointed Njdeh. On August 10, Sisian was occupied. The road to Nakhijevan was open to the Turks.
On July 29, Legran sent a telegram to Yerevan from Tiflis and suggested the resumption of negotiations without waiting for Shant’s return. Shant had left Moscow only in the beginning of August. It was decided to meet with Legran in Tiflis. Armenia, dissatisfied with the conditions that had been suggested by Chicherin, was forced to immediately sign an even more humiliating agreement.
Arshak Jamalyan and Artashes Babalyan, the representatives of the Armenian delegation in Tiflis, demanded from Legran that the Red Army leave Zangezur and Nakhijevan. However, the 11th Red Army, positioned in the Goris-Nakhijevan sector, presented an ultimatum and sought Moscow’s permission to move deeper into Armenia. Meanwhile, the Red Army continued to occupy Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhijevan.
On August 10, the Armenian delegation signed an Armenian-Russian agreement with Legran in Tiflis, specifying that military operations between the Red Army and Armenia were considered terminated. “The occupation of disputed territories [Karabakh, Zangezur, Nakhijevan] by the Soviet Army does not predetermine the resolution of the issue of Armenia’s or Azerbaijan’s rights towards those territories,” the third clause of the document stated.
On the same day, the Treaty of Sèvres was signed at the Paris Peace Conference. The treaty envisaged a united Armenia, including parts of Western Armenia. In mid-September, Shant’s delegation, which had arrived back in Yerevan, insisted that an agreement must first be reached with the Russians for the removal of its forces from Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhijevan, even at the cost of endangering the Treaty of Sèvres.
“Armenia made a huge mistake by putting forward excessively big demands without taking into consideration its strength and international capacities,” Khatisyan wrote. “By demanding everything up to Cilicia, we made all verbal agreements impossible not only with the Turks at the time when they were weak and it was still possible to negotiate with them, but also with the interested great powers. It is true, there were political figures such as Ruben Ter-Minasyan and Kajazunzi, who were in favour of limited demands, but the majority did not even want to hear about compromises.”
In Armenian historiography there are many assertions that, if the Armenian leadership had not been so intent on area, then it would have been possible to at least keep Kars and Surmalu within the republic. Diasporan historian Ara Sanjian does not agree with this assertion and thinks that there is no use in accusing the ARF too much on this issue. “Serious evidence does not exist in Turkish historiography (or we have yet not come across it) that in the summer of 1920 the Kemalists were prepared to come to an agreement with the Armenians and cease attacking Armenia. There is not sufficient evidence to say that the Armenians stubbornly refused Kemal’s logical proposals. The same is true for the Soviet authorities. There is no evidence that the Soviet authorities would have accepted the existence of an independent Armenia.”
Perhaps the Armenian leadership was mistaken and preferred the promises of the Treaty of Sèvres to a republic with more modest borders. Perhaps it was possible tocome to some tolerable agreement with Kemal. Today when there are sufficient Turkish and Russian documents open to the public, it is doubtful whether it would have been possible to prevent either the attacks by the Turkish forces and the division of Armenia between the Bolsheviks and the Kemalists, or the sovietisation of the Transcaucasus.
The Kemalist delegation returned from Moscow towards the end of August 1920 and, in September, Karabekir’s forces invaded the territory of the Republic of Armenia.
From Tatul Hakobyan’s book – ARMENIANS and TURKS
Image – Maxim Litvinov, Georgii Chicherin, and Lev Karakhan, 1923
